Topic — ARSN Niger

Security Safety

Protecting nuclear and radioactive materials against theft, sabotage, unauthorised access and malicious acts — to prevent any use for terrorist or criminal purposes.

Physical protection Détection Cybersecurity Non-proliferation
Context & challenges

Nuclear security in Niger

Niger, Africa's leading uranium producer, is particularly exposed to the risks of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and facility sabotage. Nuclear security is therefore a national priority and an international security issue.

ARSN is the national competent authority for nuclear and radiological security. It develops and implements the physical protection regulatory framework, coordinates actors and cooperates with the IAEA and international partners.

Regulated threats

Theft of nuclear materials
Enriched uranium, sealed radioactive sources
Facility sabotage
Mines, laboratories, medical equipment
Illicit trafficking
Unauthorised transport of radioactive materials
Dispersal device
"Dirty bomb" — terrorist threat
Cyber attack
Nuclear facility control systems
Insider threat
Personnel ayant accès non autorisé ou intentions malveillantes
Security architecture

The 4 pillars of nuclear security

In accordance with the IAEA Nuclear Security Framework (Nuclear Security Series), ARSN structures its action around four complementary pillars.

01

Physical protection

Protective measures for facilities, nuclear materials and radioactive sources against unauthorised access, theft and sabotage.

  • Secured perimeters and access control
  • Intrusion detection systems
  • Incident response procedures
  • Physical protection plan (PPP)
  • Security officer training
AIEA NSS 27-G
02

Detection & Response

National capabilities for detecting nuclear and radioactive materials outside regulatory control, and for responding to nuclear security incidents.

  • Border control points
  • Portable detection equipment
  • National coordination centre
  • Emergency response protocols
  • Coordination with customs and police
AIEA NSS 18
03

Nuclear cybersecurity

Protection of computer systems and control systems of nuclear facilities against cyber attacks that could compromise security.

  • Cyber vulnerability assessment
  • Operational network segregation
  • Digital access management
  • IT continuity plans
  • Cyber hygiene training
AIEA NSS 42-G
04

Action against illicit trafficking

Prevention, detection and response actions against illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials on Nigerien territory and at its borders.

  • IAEA ITDB database
  • Cooperation with Interpol
  • Uranium mine monitoring
  • Radioactive source traceability
  • Nuclear forensics investigations
AIEA NSS 25-G
Regulatory tool

The Design Basis Threat (DBT)

The Design Basis Threat (DBT) is the reference document that describes realistic threats against which nuclear facilities must protect themselves.

Niger's DBT, developed by ARSN in consultation with intelligence and security services, classifies threats by level of plausibility and severity. It is confidential but its existence is public, in accordance with IAEA recommendations.

Malicious insiders
Personnel with legitimate access who pose a threat
External actors
Individuals or groups seeking unauthorised access
Sabotage
Acts aimed at causing radiological consequences
Vol de matières
Theft of nuclear or radioactive materials
CLASSIFIED DOCUMENT
Design Basis Threat
Niger — ARSN
INFCIRC/225/Rev.5

Compliant with IAEA NSS 10 recommendations. Revised every 3 years or following a change in the security context.

National governance

National nuclear security infrastructure

Nuclear security is a shared responsibility among several national institutions, coordinated by ARSN.

ARSN
Autorité de régulation — cadre juridique, licences, inspections, coordination
Security forces
Gendarmerie, Police, National Guard — physical response to incidents
Douanes
Border detection — radiation detection equipment
Intelligence services
Threat monitoring, security context assessment for the DBT
Justice
Criminal prosecution for violations of nuclear legislation
IAEA / Partners
Technical assistance, IPPAS evaluation missions, training and equipment
Training & simulation

Exercises and training

ARSN regularly organises and supervises simulation exercises to test national response capabilities to nuclear security incidents.

Table Top Exercise (TTP)

1×/an

Tabletop simulation exercise involving decision-makers and coordinators from different agencies. Tests command chains, notification procedures and decision-making in crisis situations.

  • Scenarios: illicit trafficking, source theft, sabotage
  • Participants: ARSN, security, customs, justice
  • Outcomes: mandatory improvement report

Full-scale exercise

1×/2 ans

Operational exercise involving real deployment of intervention teams in the field. Tests detection, containment and response capabilities in real conditions.

  • Deployment of intervention teams
  • Use of detection equipment
  • Real-time multi-agency coordination

IAEA Training

Continue

Continuous training of ARSN officers and security forces in the latest detection, identification and intervention techniques, provided with IAEA support.

  • IAEA courses on nuclear security
  • Use of detection equipment
  • Nuclear forensics investigation

Report an incident

Any nuclear security event must be immediately reported to ARSN and the security forces.

Report now

Security guides

ARSN guides and IAEA NSS on physical protection, detection and nuclear cybersecurity.

Consulter les guides

Regulatory framework

Law No. 2022-058 and implementing regulations on nuclear and radiological security in Niger.

View texts

Contact NSD

Directorate of Nuclear Security — for any question on physical protection and regulation.

Contact the NSD